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 “The Anglophone term ‘governance’ can be traced to the classical 
Latin and ancient Greek words for the ‘steering’ of boats”  
Bob Jessop (1998: 30) 
1. Introduction 
In the sub discipline of political science called ‘Public Administration’, the problem of 
‘steering’ is central, and underlay much of the literature as a prerequisite for making the study 
of the rationalities and behaviour of public administrations relevant1. ‘Steering’ is anticipated 
as the legitimate goal that gives sense to the discipline and to the sheer exercise of 
administering public affairs. As B. Guy Peters states: “an effective government is a good thing 
– a view to which people living in societies without one would probably subscribe”(Peters 
2000: 40). Thus, articles and books in the discipline rarely question the basic assumption of 
the inherently normative goal of steering, as for example: What does it actually mean to 
‘steer’? What are the social relations entailed by steering, and the conditions and 
consequences of steering? Why is it legitimate to want to steer public administration (or any 
administration) all together? In the present article I try to reflect on and to give a starting point 
to how one can address these issues.  
 
From a general European viewpoint the problems of how to achieve steering and what renders 
steering difficult in a network society are widely discussed, especially within the governance 
literature (see Kooiman 1993a, Pierre 2000, etc.). Yet the normative grounds and premises 
necessary for giving sense to the practice of steering and making steering possible and 
desirable are not addressed. The aim of this article is to try to discuss and develop how the 
concept of ’governmentality’ can be used to address these problems, especially seen from the 
viewpoint of the sub discipline Public Administration. I claim that the genealogy of the 
concept of ‘governmentality’ analysed and proposed by Michel Foucault (cf. Foucault 2001: 
ref. no. 239) gives a historical explanation of why we today find steering desirable and why 
we still focus on making steering possible. 
 
The article addresses the following general overlapping questions:  
 What is the problem of ‘steering’ in the discipline of Public Administration?  
                                                 
1 I have chosen the (for native English speaking persons) incomprehensible term ‘steering’ because it does not 
have the connotations to state rule of ‘government’ or the connotations to private business of ‘management’. It 
may sound awkward, but I hope that with this term, I have found one word that encompasses both of the above 
dimensions. 
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 What are the central elements of the concept and analytics of ‘governmentality’?  
 How can the problem of ‘steering’ public administrations be analysed following a 
governmentality framework?  
 
The article consists of three parts: Each answering the above three questions: The first section 
of the article discusses the concept of  ‘steering’ as it is generally defined within the Public 
Administration and governance literature. The second part discusses and presents Foucault’s 
genealogy of the concept of ‘governmentality’ and the related concepts of subject and power. 
The third part discusses and tries to elucidate how an empirical analysis of the problem of 
steering is possible from a governmentality perspective, addressing the issue of how to 
analyse the ‘conduct of public administrations’. 
2. Steering public administrations 
The problem of steering is central to most Public Administration literature – as well as in 
many other related publications in political and social sciences (cf. Kooiman 1993a, Pierre 
2000, Pierre & Peters 2000, Kickert, Klijn & Koppenjan 1997). The problem of steering is in 
short terms identifiable as “the capacity of government to make and implement policy” (Pierre 
& Peters 2000: 1). Following this, the raison d’être of the discipline of Public Administration 
can be framed as the question of “how to make the public sector work better” (Bogason 
2001a: 167) – that is how the discipline can enhance and improve ‘the capacity of government 
to make and implement policy’. 
 
The underlying stream of ‘steering’ in most Public Administration literature is identifiable 
through the common use of rational argumentation concerning ‘means and goals’ of public 
policies, of discussions of the way the state tries to ‘enhance public service’ and ‘design’ 
public policies (Newman et.al. 2002), of the right way to achieve reliable knowledge about 
the way public administrations work (with the underlying purpose of making these better) 
(Gill & Meier 2000), of discussions about the problems entailed by wanting to make public 
administrations better (ex. by creating problems of inefficiency and ‘moral hazard’) (Miller 
2000) and of discussions about how to make public administrations and administrators more 
responsive to the democratic needs of society (that is enhancing the legitimacy of public 
administration) (cf. Box 1998, Lundquist 1998).  
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The task of simply giving an overview of the way the rationality of steering permeates the 
entire research field is in any respect far too large for the purpose, perspective and scope of 
this article2. I will restrain myself to a discussion of the concept of steering, as it is defined 
and discussed in the growing literature on governance within the Public Administration 
discipline (and related fields of political science, as for example comparative politics)3. This 
literature addresses the issue of steering through focusing on the ‘limits of steering’ which 
entails that aspects concerning steering that are implicit in much of the general Public 
Administration literature become explicit when brought into a governance analysis. As Pierre 
and Peters (2000) put it: “the governance perspective forces analysts to think about what 
perfect control from the centre of government might look like if it were ever achieved.” (Pierre 
& Peters 2000: 30) 
2.1. The governance debate 
The general debate on governance takes place in a very large and creative research field – to 
put it in an optimistic way. The apparent disadvantage of this ‘fruitfulness’ is, that many 
different uses and analyses of governance have emerged. It has thus become almost a tradition 
for researchers in the field to start an article or a book with a deploring of the many uses of 
the word ‘governance’, saying for example “that there are perhaps as many different views 
about governance as there are scholars interested in the subject”(Pierre & Peters 2000: 28).  
 
Secondly, it has also almost become a tradition for researchers to start their articles and books 
with a general overview of the different understandings and uses of the concept, potentially 
having the character of self-fulfilling prophecies, leading to a growing number of 
‘governance-schools’ and potentially making the confusion about the concept grow. Thus, 
Rhodes identified “at least six separate uses of governance” in 1997 (Rhodes 1997:46-47, see 
also Rhodes 2000), while Kooiman in 1999 “found at least double that amount”(Kooiman 
1999: 68-69). 
 
Yet the imprecise and widespread uses of the word and the different analyses this diversity 
gives rise to also have clear advantages. They witness a large and diversified (and in that 
sense detailed and rich) research field, and an intensive concern with the way society is to be 
                                                 
2 For a discussion of the normative consequences of the rationality of steering, see Bang (2003, forthcoming) 
3 I further restrain my discussion to articles and books published in English. For a review of the Danish 
governance debate, see Bogason 2001b, 2001c. 
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governed and the consequences of changing conditions, analytical perspectives, etc. The great 
variety in the field also invites others into the debate, instead of creating closed arenas of 
specialists agreeing on the precise use of complicated concepts. And the ongoing (meta-) 
reflections on the conditions of governance and governing itself highlight central issues “that 
go to the heart of the relationship between government and society”(Pierre & Peters 2000: 29) 
– that is to the heart of what political science in general and Public Administration in 
particular is about. 
 
This last issue is reflected in a third tradition in the writing style of the governance debate, 
that follow the deploring and defining of the many uses and understandings of governance in 
the books and articles. Indeed, almost all researchers subsequently agree that some common 
features of the governance perspective exist – at least in the sense it is given in Public 
Administration and related political science writings – although the issues they respectively 
raise may vary to some degree. These common features are central to understanding what 
steering is and what the subject of steering can be – the state, networks, firms or communities 
– each of these distinct parts of a legitimate whole that we usually label ‘society’. 
 
Most researchers identify the core issue of the governance problem as a difference between a 
society structured by a stronger state and a society that is less structured by a less strong state, 
or at least by a state with a changed role. This difference is for example described as a 
difference between ‘old’ and ‘new’ governance (Peters 2000), between steering as a ‘one way 
traffic’ and as a ‘two way traffic’ (Kooiman 1993b), between hierarchy and heterarchy 
(Jessop 1998), between a central governing authority and the lack of one (Kickert, Klijn & 
Koppenjan 1997) and finally in it’s most simple form as a difference between government and 
governance (Rhodes 1997, 2000) – to name but a few typologies.  
 
The main conclusion regarding steering that the different researchers agree on is that steering 
is not what it used to be. Yet there are substantial differences between the researchers, when it 
comes to defining the way steering is altered. This is also due to the fact that the analyses 
address the issue in different ways – as Rhodes writes in an often-quoted phrase, governance 
“can refer to a new process of governing; or a changed condition of ordered rule; or the new 
method by which society is governed” (Rhodes 2000: 55). Generally, governance researchers 
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can be categorized in two different groups4: The first group claims that the conditions of 
ordered state rule have changed (Mayntz 1993, Jessop 1998, Peters 2000, Pierre & Peters 
2000). The second group claims that we need a new understanding of the way governing takes 
place – as a new process of governing (Kickert Klijn & Koppenjan 1997, Kooiman 1993b, 
Dunsire 1993, Rhodes 2000).  
 
In both groups, there are advocates of the conception of governance as a new method of 
governing – as for example ‘collibration’ (Dunsire 1993, Jessop 1998); or as encompassing 
new management strategies (Kickert, Klijn & Koppenjan 1997). Additionally, some of the 
researchers also define or discuss the problem of governance as the problem of finding a new 
method or theory to analyse the changed process or conditions of governing (Kooiman 1999, 
Rhodes 2000, see also Bang & Dyrberg 1999, Andersen 2003, forthcoming)5. 
2.2. Governance vs. government 
In the view of researchers who mainly position the governance problem as a problem of 
‘changed conditions of ordered rule’ a general difference is usually at the root of their 
analysis: the difference between a hierarchical state as we knew it (or think we knew it) and 
the way society is regulated today – where the hierarchical state is challenged.  
 
For example, Peters draw a distinction between ‘old’ and ‘new’ governance in a supervisory 
article from 2000 (Peters 2000). The first perspective is “the more traditional ‘steering’ 
conception of governance” where “the question becomes one of the capacity of the center of 
government to exert control”. The second perspective is the “’new governance’ perspective” 
where “the question becomes one of how that center of government interacts with society” 
(Peters 2000: 36). As Peters writes subsequently, this distinction “leads to a associated 
question of whether steering decisions made by government can be implemented” (ibid.) 
 
This is precisely the question that Renate Mayntz reflects upon in an article about ‘governing 
failures and the problem of governability’ (Mayntz 1993). She lists four different ‘governing 
failures’ that are connected to “regulatory policies” – that is to ‘old governance’ or the 
‘traditional steering conception’ (op.cit. 13):  
                                                 
4 Of course, this distinction between researchers is open for critical enquiry and is not clear-cut. Both 
perspectives may indeed be present in a writing (cf. Pierre & Peters 2000: chap. 1 and 9) 
5 Obviously, a new topic of analysis (i.e. a new process of governing), may ask for a new method of analysis or 
theory. Or is it the new method that permits us to see the new process? 
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 1. The implementation problem: Which refer to a situation where “the executive 
authorities are unable to enforce the norms”. 
2. The motivation problem: Which is connected to the first problem, and refers to a 
situation where “the target groups are not willing to comply”. 
3. The knowledge problem: Which refer to a situation where “the original problem does 
not disappear or when in the process of implementation, all kinds of unwanted side-
effects appear”. 
4. The governability problem: Which is connected to the third problem, and refers to a 
situation characterised by the “impossibility to intervene […] in certain system 
processes by means of the instruments available to central authorities” 
 
As she states, “presently the emphasis seems to be on governability” – that is on the limits to 
state control of and intervention in society. In the rest of the article, she argues against the 
centrality of the governability problem, especially in the sense it has been given in systems 
theory, since in her view, “this theory seems to lead to a wrong diagnosis of the real 
governability problems” (op.cit. 16, see also Kooiman 1999: 71-72). She rejects the systems 
theoretical claim that systems cannot communicate with each other, and that ordered state rule 
therefore is impossible (cf. Luhmann 1997). Indeed, she claims that for several reasons 
(Mayntz 1993: 16-18) – “highly organized social subsystems can enhance governability” 
(op.cit. 18).  
 
Thus, following Mayntz, steering is not impossible, even though it encounters severe 
limitations. It is possible to enhance governability, for example through detailed analyses of 
structures and processes of policy sectors, a research task she founded at the Max Planck 
Institute. Especially the focus on policy processes is important, since “it is not so much the 
kind of governing instruments that are crucial [to enhancing governability] but a special form 
of organizing the policy process to secure that in the decision making process not only 
information about the needs and fears of actors in the policy field is taken into account, but 
more importantly also indications of side-effects, interdependencies and emerging problems” 
(op.cit. 20, my underlining).  
 
The research objective out-lined above is absolutely sympathetic and important, yet the 
problem with it is, that it is a jump back to governing failure no. 3: the knowledge problem. 
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Therefore, the inherent assumption of ‘organized societal actors’ (i.e. a state) capable of 
steering is left untouched – and the system theoretical suggestion to ‘decentralize’ the issue of 
the subject of steering (from one to many centres or subjects) is turned down. Steering is still 
seen as the privilege of one central entity (however fragmented it may be), and the possible 
answer to the governability problem is to govern better to overcome governing failures.  
 
Bob Jessop describes and analyses governance and it’s inevitable failure in a similar vein 
(Jessop 1998). Jessop distinguishes between three “different modes of coordination”: 
“heterarchic governance in contrast to anarchic ex post coordination through market 
exchange and imperative ex ante co-ordination through hierarchical forms of organization” 
(Jessop 1998: 29). He describes the different failures each mode of coordination leads to, and 
finally, he explores the issue of ‘meta-governance’, that is “the organization of self-
organization” – in a way similar to Mayntz (whom he explicitly is inspired of, as well as he is 
inspired of systems theory and the related concept of ‘self-organisation’ – autopoiesis).  
  
The idea of meta-governance “should not be confused with a super-ordinate level of 
government to which all governance arrangements are subordinated” (op.cit. 42). Instead, 
meta-governance concerns the “design of institutions and generation of visions”, and 
generally touches upon “shaping the context within which heterarchies can be forged” (ibid.). 
As he then intrepidly asserts: “States have a major role here” – that is as the generator of this 
context, where institutions and visions can develop. 
 
However, Jessop is aware of the facts that ‘as governance fails, so will meta-governance 
fail’6. For the state to exert meta-governance it is therefore “necessary to adopt a satisfying 
approach to these attempts” (Jessop 1998: 43). This ‘satisfying approach’ first implies a “self-
reflexive orientation to what will prove satisfactory in the case of failure” (ibid.). Secondly, it 
implies the development of a strategy of ‘collibration’ (cf. Dunsire 1993), where several 
responses to steering failures are developed and used, thus providing a ‘requisite variety’ of 
strategies and tactics of steering (Jessop 1998: 43). Finally, a ‘satisfying approach’ requires 
‘the soft irony of the joker’ (see footnote 6) which implies that even though the risk of failure 
is recognised, governing must go on “as if success where possible” (op.cit. 44). Basically, 
Jessop is self-reflective about the shortcomings of his own arguments, and this is why he 
                                                 
6 I here cite Bob Jessop from the public lecture he gave at the inaugural conference of the ‘MODINET’ research 
project at the Royal Library in Copenhagen, September 6, 2002. 
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advocates for an equally self-reflexive irony regarding the almost impossible act that the state 
is entailed to play in a ‘centre-less’ society.  
2.3. Steering policy networks 
Governance as ever marked by ‘governance failures’ and therefore requiring irony as a 
governance tool is nevertheless not the only way out of the debate on the hard times of ‘old’ 
as well as ‘new’ governance. Several researchers adhering to the governance perspective (as 
well as researchers from related fields) reject a ‘state-centric’ approach and solution to 
governance problems, and state that the issue of governance needs new concepts and theories. 
In the anthology “Managing Complex Networks – Strategies for the Public Sector”, the so-
called ‘Rotterdam governance-club’ (cf. Rhodes 2000: 60) offers an insightful contribution to 
the discussion of how steering is possible and how it can be conceptualised within this ‘new 
process’ perspective.  
 
In their introductory chapter, Walter Kickert, Erik-Hans Klijn & Joop Koppenjan (hereafter 
called KKK) state: “we are witnessing a worldwide departure of the dark days of complete 
lack of trust and confidence in the public sector” (Kickert, Klijn & Koppenjan 1997: 1). Yet 
the “call for government involvement” is not a call for the state to re-enter it’s “post-war 
position as the central governing authority in society”, since “the steering potentials of 
government are limited”(ibid.).   
 
What is needed instead, KKK state, is a need to reflect “upon the relation between 
government and society” (ibid.), by focusing on “the concept of policy networks”. Instead of 
focusing on the efficiency and legitimacy problems that policy networks (also) give rise to, 
KKK claim that the concept of networks offers a way to reframe the issue of government, 
where policy networks are seen as “an opportunity for public policy making and governance”.  
 
As KKK make it clear “a network perspective differs in a number of ways from more 
conventional views on governance and public management”. One of the reasons for this is to 
find in KKK’s definition of governance. Indeed, they choose a relatively broad definition, 
saying, “governance can roughly be described as directed influence of societal processes. It 
covers all kinds of guidance mechanisms which are connected with public policy processes” 
(Kickert, Klijn & Koppenjan 1997: 2). 
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Following KKK, governance not only concerns the actions of public governmental 
institutions, since … “government does not perform all the governing itself” (my underlining). 
“All kinds of actors are involved in governance” and “self-steering mechanisms exist which 
ensure that policy processes proceed smoothly” (ibid.). The ‘state’ or more precisely public 
governmental institutions are parts of “the social system and [are] only [some] of the many 
social actors influential in public policy processes” (op.cit. 5).  
 
KKK define policy networks as “more or less stable patterns of social relations between 
interdependent actors which take shape around policy problems and/or policy programmes” 
(op.cit. 30). The goal and function of governmental steering in a network becomes 
“coordinating strategies of actors with different goals and preferences” (op.cit. 10), which 
entails that “network management is an activity that takes place at the meta-level” (op.cit. 
44). Their book concerns how this meta-level steering is possible, through the analysis of “the 
potentials of a network perspective on governance and public management for managing 
policy networks” (op.cit. 2). 
 
KKK’s argument concerning ‘meta-steering’ is related to Jessop’s argument concerning meta-
governance. However, they do not address the issue from the viewpoint of a (flawed) state, 
trying against all odds to ‘have a role’ or to insert some authority. To KKK, it is clear from 
the beginning that the state cannot have this authoritative role (cf. op.cit. 1). As they say in 
their concluding chapter, “in principle, every actor who is active in the policy process can 
fulfil the role of manager” (op.cit. 168). A network perspective thus raises empirical questions 
that entail “that we analyse management strategies and then look at which actor is 
responsible” (ibid.).  
 
In the works of Jan Kooiman, a similar rejection of a one-dimensional view on steering is 
identifiable (1993b, 1999, 2000, 2003, forthcoming). For KKK, the lesson of governance as a 
new process of governing is primarily practical, and entails managerial demands for new 
practices of management. In the case of Kooiman, the lesson is primarily theoretical, and 
entails an intellectual demand for new theory. Thus Kooiman builds up a new theoretical 
approach to analysing governance as a ‘new process’, which he calls ‘social-political 
governance’ (Kooiman 1999: 74).  
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The core issue of his argument is, that “present-day societies”, the “opportunities and 
problems” they face, and their “institutional conditions” all are dynamic, diverse and complex 
(op.cit. 74-75). This entails the demand for equally dynamic, diverse and complex answers, 
either as attempts at ‘social-political governing’ or as a theoretical approach as such. Thus, 
Kooiman develops a complex model of analysis, involving the analysis of dynamic societal 
interactions and diverse governing orders (ibid.; see also Kooiman 2003, forthcoming). 
 
Rod Rhodes (2000) also advocates for a network approach, and connects it to a new method 
of analysis, the study of narratives. Yet his analyses of the ‘differentiated polity’, of 
governance and of networks (Rhodes 1997) are difficult to place in any governance category, 
since he interchangeably uses at least three different definitions of the governance problem. 
Roughly speaking, his analysis jumps between understanding governance as facts, 
institutional variance or a new method of governing. 
 
When analysing and speaking of the ‘differentiated polity’ (ibid.), he asserts that hierarchical 
steering never has been a realistic characteristic of British government. Inter-governmental 
relations have always been broad in scope, subject areas and participants – the ‘facts’ of 
British government seems to be, that it was ‘hollow’ from the beginning (op.cit. 7). On the 
other hand, he states several times in his book that networks “are a third governing structure” 
(op.cit. 57) beside the market and hierarchical governing, and that it should be possible for 
government to choose the most appropriate institutional structure in different policy-areas and 
settings. 
 
However, the third (and I assess most dominant) strand in his analyses is on the consequences 
of a network perspective, both for understanding policy-outcomes, governance and the 
possibility of theorizing about them. He explicitly places himself within his own ‘new 
process’ group of governance researchers (op.cit. 15), and his definition of governance as 
referring to “self-organizing, interorganizational networks” (op.cit. 53) is followed by a list of 
characteristics that tends to ‘deconstruct’ the idea of a state or a governmental locus 
independent from the processes and structures of interactions in networks.  
 
For example, Rhodes stresses “interdependence between organizations” (ibid.) – which 
entails that “the boundaries between public, private and voluntary sectors became shifting 
and opaque”.  On the other hand, he stresses a few lines below that “although the state does 
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not occupy a sovereign position, it can indirectly and imperfectly steer networks” (ibid.). How 
can the state at the same time be a part of a ‘shifting and opaque’ network, and still be 
identified as an entity capable of steering, however indirectly and imperfectly? This seems to 
be a contradiction. Rhodes is not clear as to whether the state should be reinterpreted (as a 
part of networks), restated (as relatively powerful) or rejected (as hollow) as a category in 
understanding steering. 
 
In his article in the anthology of Jon Pierre (2000), ‘Debating Governance – Authority, 
Steering and Democracy’, Rhodes (2000) apparently comes closer to asserting that the state 
and the capacity of government to steer society should be reinterpreted. Through connecting 
his own view of and analysis of governance and networks to a narrative approach (Rhodes 
2000: 64-86), he favours the unique stories of diverse participants in governance at several 
levels over the idea (or narrative!) of the state and government as a unitary actor standing 
beside or above networks. In addition, the narrative approach not only tends to deconstruct the 
idea of a unitary state, it also deconstructs the idea of steering and the common self-
understanding of the discipline of Public Administration as well. Thus, government – 
administration – society interaction may not necessarily be framed as concerning steering7. 
On this I will elaborate in the final section of this article. 
 
The governance debate is large and diverse, and only parts of the many central arguments 
concerning steering have been touched upon in the discussion above. However, I have 
roughly sketched out two general perspectives in the governance debate that differ in their 
view on steering and on who the subject of steering might be: 
1. In the first perspective, the subject of steering is the state or government. It is seen as 
the central actor that has the capacity (and legitimacy) to enforce the operation 
‘steering’. The discussions concern how the state can enhance or strengthen it’s 
capacity to steer, despite governance failures and problems. The state is seen generally 
as a unitary actor that stands above or beside society. This entails a one-dimensional 
rationality of steering – as a one-way traffic – where power is a capacity and a 
privilege of the state or government. 
2. In the second perspective, the state is not the only ‘steering subject’, and therefore 
several societal actors are capable of enforcing the operation of ‘steering’. The 
                                                 
7 As Rhodes’ reference to ‘the everyday maker’ (cf. Bang & Sørensen 1998) tends to show. 
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discussions concern what steering is or could be, given that the state is a relatively 
unclear actor on the same level as other societal actors (who also are rather unclear – 
at least theoretically)8. This entails a multi-dimensional rationality of steering – as a 
two-way traffic – which empowers all participating subjects (not only the state, but 
also networks, communities, street-level bureaucrats, etc.) and gives all actions 
direction (and not only the ones identifiable to the state). 
 
Still the conceptual, normative and historical grounds from which these definitions of steering 
originate are left unexplored. The question remains why we find steering desirable, in 
whatever form it takes – ‘old’, ‘new public’ or network management. Further, the question is 
also how the issue of steering has emerged historically, and how steering has become possible 
according to that historic view. My answer in this article will be, that the concept and 
rationality of steering can be explained as the establishment of contingent historic norms and 
expectations about power, rule and subjects, which gradually have emerged for approximately 
the last 2500 years of the development of so-called western civilization. In the following 
section, I will elaborate on this and discuss how Michel Foucault in several lectures and 
articles analysed this historical development as a “governmentalization of the state” (Foucault 
2001, ref. 239: 656, see also ref. no. 291, 306, Dean 1999).  
3. Governmentality 
The issue of ‘governmentality’ was raised by Michel Foucault in the late 1970’ies and has 
developed in several directions since (cf. Dean 1999, Dyrberg 2001). It has also to a certain 
extent been taken up within the discipline of Public Administration and in the governance 
literature (cf. O' Malley, Weir & Shearing 1997, Kooiman 1999, Jessop 2001). In the 
following I will try to give a rather intensive discussion and analysis of the concept of 
governmentality as it is developed in Foucault’s own writings (a feeling of redundancy will 
certainly pertain to familiars of Foucault).  
 
The purpose of my discussion will be to answer the following questions: 
A. How Foucault conceives the state as an emerging form of power, and  
                                                 
8 This unclear picture of what steering is or could be is one of the reasons why Pierre & Peters (2000) in their 
discussion of ‘governance, politics and the state’ deliberately choose a state-centric approach (cf. Pierre & Peters 
2000: 26-27). 
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B. What the prerequisites of this form of power are9.  
I will answer the questions by analysing the subject of power, the object of power, the 
rationality of power operations and the goal/telos of power for each form and modality of 
power emerging prior to the modern state in the eighteenth century. 
 
Answering these questions will lead to the answering of the questions of  
1. Why is steering desirable? 
2. What makes steering possible? 
Finally, the analysis of governmentality as a form of power prepares the ground for answering 
the question of how a study of the problem of steering can be analysed following a 
governmentality perspective – and what the contributions of the governmentality perspective 
are to the governance debate and analyses. 
3.1. A genealogy of government 
Generally, I view Foucault’s analysis of governmentality as a roughly sketched genealogy of 
the concept of government. His analysis concerns how a certain form of power has emerged 
that he calls ‘the State of government’ (Foucault 2001: ref. no. 239: 656)10. Governmentality, 
or more simply governmental power, is thus not the only possible form of power, but 
Foucault’s argument is that this form of power has become dominant more or less since the 
Enlightenment, at least within the state itself and political science. However, as in the second 
part of the governance literature discussed above, the state is not to be seen as a unitary actor 
that arrived on Earth 200 years ago and has dominated us in more and more subtle ways ever 
since. 
 
The issue at stake here is, that the development of a ‘state of government’ should be 
understood as a contingent process dependent on several other factors, for example previous 
power forms and modalities available for this state. A genealogy thus in no way demonstrates 
a linear ‘Hegelian’ teleology of power forms (cf. Dupont & Pearce 2001), but is instead an 
analysis of a fragmentary and in many ways undetermined process where strategies become 
connected. Strategies are to be understood in Foucault’s own terms as consisting of “several 
                                                 
9 I analyse Foucault’s argument as a contribution to a theoretical as well as empirical debate about the emergence 
of the modern state, and do not question the empirical validity of it. For a deeper analysis of the validity, 
consistency and productivity of Foucault’s argument, see Dean 1999. 
10 I have chosen to use exclusively the French edition of Foucault’s articles in ’Dits et écrits’, vol. II (Foucault 
2001) and to translate relevant parts myself, since there are slight differences between the French and English 
editions. I therefore do not go into discussions about which versions are the most correct. 
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ideas formulated or proposed from different points of view and objectives”. A strategy “ finds 
its motive in searching for different objectives simultaneously, with several obstacles to 
overcome and several ways of doing it”. In short, a strategy “cumulates advantages and 
multiplies the benefits” (Foucault 2001: ref. no. 277: 836). Further, Foucault’s own analysis is 
so filled with ‘loose ends’, circular arguments, self-contradictions and repetitions that it is a 
gross oversimplification to accuse it of representing a deliberate teleology.  
3.2. Political power 
As seen from Foucault’s perspective, the rationality of government and of the state has 
multiple historic lines reaching far back in history. One of them has its anchoring point in the 
Antiquity with the establishment of ‘the political’ as a matter of concern and practice in 
Greece. Analysing (among others) Plato’s writings on politics, Foucault finds that the subject 
of power is the king or the politician heading the city. His ‘role’ or the operation he was to 
enforce was to mediate between the various interests present in the city, to combine ‘virtues’ 
and ‘temperaments’. As Foucault writes, quoting Plato: “the royal art of governing consisted 
in gathering the living ‘into a community that rests on accordance and friendship’ and in that 
sense to weave ‘the most magnificent of all tissues’. ” (Foucault 2001: ref. no. 291: 962). The 
object of power available to the king to weave this tissue was the “’shuttle’ of popular 
opinion” (ibid.). Finally, the goal of politics in this rationality of power in Ancient Greece 
concerned the “forming and securing of the unity of the city” (op.cit. 963). “The problem of 
politics is that of the relation between the one and the many in the framework of the city and 
its citizens” (ibid.).  
 
The Greek conception of politics is both challenged and continued through the Roman Empire 
and medieval times. Apparently, the central concern of politics in the Medieval Age becomes 
the issue of sovereignty. In a detailed discussion and analysis of the way ‘sovereignty’ – as a 
concept and practice – is challenged by an emergent literature on ‘arts of government’ in the 
sixteenth century, Foucault focuses on some of the features of a sovereign form of power that 
shares some aspects with the Greek conception of politics.  
3.3. Sovereignty 
Foucault’s analysis of sovereignty is seen through the lenses of the ‘arts of government’ 
literature, a series of treaties written in the sixteenth century. These are in great part a 
reflection upon and critique of Machiavelli’s ‘The Prince’. Not in an absolute theoretical 
sense, but in a sense relative to what the authors of ‘arts of government’ literature wished to 
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assert and discuss. As Foucault puts it about the authors of the ‘anti-machiavellian literature’, 
“one gives oneself or reconstructs oneself an adversary Machiavelli” (Foucault 2001: ref. no. 
239: 638). The issue at stake is, that the reception and use of Machiavelli’s book by the ‘anti-
machiavellian literature’ need not necessarily concern what Machiavelli originally meant, or 
what we can deduce from his book today. Instead the ‘anti-machiavellian literature’ should be 
interpreted in its positivity, as a “positive genre that has its objects, its concepts, its strategy” 
(ibid.). 
 
In the ‘constructed Machiavellian’ conception of government as sovereignty, the subject of 
power is (not surprisingly) the prince. The relation between the prince and his principality is 
characterised as being exterior to him, artificial and transcendental. This entails that the 
relation of the prince to his principality is fragile and constantly threatened. “There is no a 
priori immediate reason for the subjects to accept the authority of the prince” (op.cit. 639). 
Again, this entails that the operations of the prince are to be the dispositions that will keep and 
reinforce the (abstract) relation between himself and his principality. The fragility of the 
relation requires a constant focus on the threats opposing the prince. And the relation requires 
“an art of manipulating power relations” (ibid.), that is the capacity for playing strategic 
games, playing out adversaries against each other etc.  
  
Foucault identifies the object of sovereign government as being the territory that the prince 
governs. The populations living on the territory are (only) seen as “variables related to the 
territory, which is the foundation itself of the principality and sovereignty” (op.cit. 643). And 
related to the argument above, Foucault identifies the goal of sovereign power as sovereignty 
itself, obtained through the ability of the prince to stay in power, and through the subjects’ 
compliance to the law (op.cit. 645-646). 
 
The connection between the ancient Greek conception of power and government, and the 
conception of sovereignty is, that both operate with a unilateral connection between a ruler 
and the ruled, and a unitary goal of government – to forge a unity of the many interests 
present in the city, or to reinforce the position of the prince. The difference between the 
conceptions is that Greek political rule consisted in uniting and mediating between interests, 
while sovereign rule consisted in reinforcing a power relation between the prince and his 
principality. The multiple political interests were at best the inputs to a strategic power game, 
while mediation of interests and public opinion were irrelevant. 
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3.4. Pastoral power 
While political government in ancient Greece and a sovereign form of power in medieval 
times developed, a parallel historical development concerning power and rule outside the state 
(or city) occurred. This form of power concerned the government of souls through the relation 
of God to his ‘disciples’, translated in worldly terms into the pastoral power of the pastor in 
relation to his ‘flock’. It is Foucault’s argument that this form of power has had a deep impact 
on the rationality of our governmental state and has become related to the development of 
governmentality from the sixteenth century and onwards (Foucault 2001: ref. no. 291).  
 
The pastoral form of power is seen as having its roots in the ancient Hebrew society. The 
essential elements in the Hebrew conception of pastoral power were, that the subject of 
power, the pastor, was responsible for the well being of his flock and for the uniting of them. 
The object of power was the flock, rather than the territory, as in the sovereign power form. 
The operation the pastor was to enforce was to ‘assemble, guide and conduct’ Foucault 2001: 
ref. no. 291: 957) his flock, and the flock only existed to the extent that he did that. The 
operation of governing through pastoral power thus required the pastor since without him the 
flock would split. Finally, the goal of pastoral power was to continually conduct the flock to 
‘good pastures’ and ultimately to provide for their divine salvation (op.cit. 956-958).  
 
This model was further developed in medieval times through Christian interpretations. The 
contributions of Christianity were, that the personal relation between the pastor and his flock 
was further elaborated on. The pastor was seen as responsible for every act the flock and each 
sheep were to do in detail. This entailed that the pastor “has to know what goes on in the soul 
of each” (op.cit. 965). And further led to the Christian appropriation of ancient technologies 
of the self, self-examination and the direction of conscience (advice). Following this, 
Christian pastoral power instituted a situation of ‘permanent guidance’ of the flock.  
 
Additionally, the goal of pastoral power, salvation, was also further developed. It led to the 
establishing of a “personal linkage of obedience” between each sheep and the pastor (op.cit. 
964). Obedience was seen as a goal in itself, and therefore, obedience became a virtue. This 
meant that each individual was to follow each and every order of the pastor to reach salvation.  
From this followed that the individual had to give up himself and his interests in this world to 
have the chance to be saved in the After World (op.cit. 964, 966). Christian Pastoral power 
thus also introduced a situation of ‘permanent obedience’ to a higher order. 
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3.5. Economic power 
According to Foucault, pastoral power and the government of souls became connected to the 
politics of a state in the emergent literature on ‘arts of government’ in the sixteenth century. 
This literature is a part of a general contestation of the act of governing, which pertains not 
only to states, but also to the government of one self, of souls and conducts, and of children. 
“How to govern one self, how to be governed, how to govern others, who should one accept to 
be governed by, how to become the best possible governor” (Foucault 2001: ref. no. 239: 636) 
are the questions and problems that are raised in the sixteenth century. These questions are 
raised as two processes are developing concomitantly, one of centralisation, leading to the 
establishment of the “great territorial, administrative, colonial States” (ibid.) and one of 
decentralisation, concerning the way “one should be spiritually guided on this earth towards 
one’s destiny” (ibid.), that is how one should be governed (by e.g. pastoral power) and govern 
one self – and ultimately pertaining to the ethical question of who and what a human being is 
or should be. 
 
Through contestation of a ‘constructed Machiavelli’ (cf. p.15), the themes raised by the ‘arts 
of government’ literature are in a sense a deconstruction of a sovereign conception of power. 
First, the subject of power is no longer only a ‘prince’ (or any another regent). Instead, the 
authors recall regularly – rather innocently – that governing consists of “multiple practices, 
since many people govern” (op.cit. 640), for example the family father, the superior of a 
convent, the teacher, etc. The relation of the prince to his principality is therefore only one 
modality of power, and the subject of power is no longer one person or entity, but become 
multiple persons.  
 
Second, all these practices and relations of government take place within the state. This 
conception challenges (e.g. deconstructs) the singularity of the prince to his principality. A 
variety of government levels appear or are constructed, among which the task of defining 
what pertains to the totality of the practices of government, that is to the entire state, is a 
central one. This gives rise to a model of government with three types of government: The 
government of one self, the government of the family and the government of the state (ibid.), 
The operation that the multiple subjects are to enforce is thus also divided in at least three 
types or levels.  
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Thirdly, the object of government in the ‘arts of government’ literature is no longer seen as 
the territory, but instead becomes a “sort of complex constituted by men and things” (op.cit. 
642). This ‘sort of complex’ is what Foucault a few pages before named ‘the economy’ 
(op.cit. 641-642). The economy in the sixteenth century designated “the right way to manage 
individuals, goods, wealth, as is possible inside a family” (op.cit. 641-642). A central part of 
the debate in the ‘arts of government’ literature thus concerned, “how to introduce this 
attention, this meticulous concern, this type of relation between a family father and his family 
inside the management of a state” (op.cit. 642).  
 
Foucault further states, that ‘the introduction of the economy into politics is what, I think, is to 
become the essential stakes of government” (ibid.). “In the sixteenth century, the term 
economy designated a form of government; in the eighteenth century, it will designate a level 
of reality, a field of intervention” (ibid.). Our conception of the economy as a separate sphere 
of society is thus not ‘original’ – instead it could be said that ‘the economy’ is born out of, or 
was a product of deliberate reasoning about the state and government.  
 
Finally, the goal of government is a “plurality of specific goals” (op.cit. 646). These specific 
goals are for example to promote wealth and prosperity, to help the people by giving them 
basic means of subsistence, to promote the ability of the population to grow, etc.  Related to 
the operational level of this rationality of government, this again entails, that a large number 
of specific ‘tactics’ and means are being invented. In this sense, the abstract laws of 
sovereignty become means for other ends (ibid.). This invention of multiple tactics is again 
tied to the development of the discipline of Public Administration, since the latter explicitly 
concerns how all these instruments and tactics are to ‘work better’.  
 
Indeed, this has lead one scholar to propose a renaming of the historical development of 
governmentality as “managementality” – seeing the “emergence of management as a political 
form of rationality” (Altunok 2000: 74) and the transformation of ruling into “a technical 
knowledge” (ibid.) as the central part of the story, which the term ‘governmentality’ 
potentially eludes, since it unconsciously leads us to think of it as matters only pertaining to 
the government of a state. Indeed, I agree that the history of governmentality is also the 
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history of management in any sense of the term11. This is also what I want to emphasize in 
this article. However, Foucault’s own focus was primarily on the development of a 
governmental rationality pertaining to the ‘collective subject’ we call a state, thus raising a 
concern (in e.g. political science and Public Administration) for governmental power as being 
primarily state power, as I have emphasized in the first part of this article. 
3.6. State power  
The conceptions launched in the ‘arts of government’ literature are developed further 
approximately a century later in the so-called ‘reason of state’ doctrine (Foucault 2001: ref. 
no. 239: 648 & ref. no. 291: 969).  The contribution of this is primarily to introduce the ‘state’ 
as the ultimate means of its own ends (op.cit. 970), as the unitary subject of government. This 
is both a break with the pastoral form of power, (as exemplified by Foucault with a reference 
to the understanding of rule of St. Thomas of Aquinas) where divine salvation was the goal of 
rule. But it is also a continuation of the rationality of ‘permanent obedience’ – The divine end 
of salvation being substituted to the mundane end of state politics.  
 
The ‘Reason of state’ doctrine builds upon the ‘arts of government’ debate, since it in a sense 
‘recenters’ the multiple concerns of the contestation of government and rule of the sixteenth 
century to become common issues of a state. Thus, the goal of the ‘reason of state’ doctrine is 
the state itself, and the various goals of ‘the arts of government’ literature become means to 
enforce and expand the power of the state. The stakes of the ‘reason of state’ doctrine is thus 
in a way to combine or reintroduce the themes of the Antique Platonic conception of politics 
into seventeenth century debates of government; that is the unique goal of securing the unity 
of the city – but with a much larger available ‘arsenal’ of means (possible operations) to do 
so.  
 
These operations are developed further within what Foucault calls the “doctrine of the police” 
(Foucault 2001: ref. no. 291: 969) or what in Germany was called “Polizeiwissenschaft” – 
‘the science of police’ – which was the term used to designate the discipline of Public 
Administration at the time. The operations of the police are multiple. Foucault cites different 
parts of the literature, and the most detailed description states that there are eleven concerns of 
the police inside the state:  
                                                 
11 See again Altunok on this point. She makes an excellent case of the etymological meaning and history of the 
words ‘rule’ and ‘management’ where the latter almost precisely concern ‘the art of government’ of the sixteenth 
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“1) Religion, 2) morality, 3) health, 4) provision, 5) roads, bridges and pavements, and 
public buildings, 6) public security, 7) liberal arts (in short, arts and sciences), 8) 
business, 9) factories, 10) servants and prisoners, 11) the poor” (op.cit. 975-976). 
The ‘police’ thus determine the totality of the “new domain, in which the centralised political 
and administrative power can intervene” (op.cit. 976).  
 
The object of the state and of the ‘police’, in turn is the population and the life of each 
individual, in all of its aspects. The state thus takes over the devotion to saving the life of each 
and every individual within the territory from the pastoral form of power, again with the sharp 
distinction that the devotion in pastoral power has divine salvation as its goal, while state 
politics in the seventeenth century has the strengthening of the state itself as its goal.  
3.7. The population as the locus of power 
An essential part of the development of governmentality is this; that the population becomes 
the locus of governmental power, through several processes, but accordingly primarily 
through the ‘pastoralisation’ of political power. This entails that the concepts of the 
individual, of subjectivity and the ethical question of what constitutes a human being have 
become central issues for society and for us in modern societies. A central part of Foucault’s 
argument that runs through most of his research (cf. Foucault 2001: ref. no. 306: 1042) is that 
the subject as we know it today is a consequence of a specific historic development 
concomitant to and to some extent coextensive with the development of a modern 
governmental state.  
 
Through the concern for the population, former and newer forms of power become modalities 
to a governmental form of state power. Scientific, pastoral, disciplinary, economic and 
sovereign forms of power become connected and change status from being and having their 
own means and ends to becoming modalities. This does not mean that they cease to exist and 
develop in other directions, that they loose importance or necessarily become ‘deformed’. On 
the contrary, it could be argued (and Foucault to a certain extent does) that through their 
‘governmentalization’ these other forms of power gain in strength and longevity (cf. Foucault 
2001: ref. no. 239: 656). 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
century that Foucault analyses in Foucault 2001: ref. no. 239. 
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The contribution of the sciences to the ‘governmentalization’ and strengthening of the state 
evolves through the ‘measuring’ of the life and health of the population as rates of mortality, 
fertility, poverty, illnesses etc. – for example through statistics, but also later on through the 
humanities (op.cit. 972). The pastoral form of power contributes with the concern for each 
and every individual. Additionally, it turns morality into a governmental issue, and especially 
contributes with the moral codex of ‘permanent guidance’ and ‘permanent obedience’ (as is in 
focus in Weber’s classical work on protestant ethics in capitalist society). The disciplinary 
form of power provides the structural framework that is the condition of possibility for 
managing the population “in depth, delicately and in detail” (Foucault 2001: ref. no. 239: 
654). It provides the ‘quadrillage’ of society that renders an attempt to control and guide each 
individual sensible (see Foucault 1975: 197). 
 
The economic form of power contributes with the invention of a ‘political economy’ (op.cit. 
642, 653), that is the creation of “a nation-wide administration of house-keeping” (Arendt 
1999: 28). And it contributes with the ‘family’ as an element of intervention, inside the 
population, and as an instrument to govern populations, thus becoming a “fundamental relay 
of the government of it” (Foucault 2001: ref. no. 239: 651 & 652). The contribution of a 
sovereign form of power to the strengthening of the state, are on the one hand to provide the 
instruments or operations necessary to fulfil the ‘negative task’ of ”die Politik” that “consists 
in, for the state, to fight ones enemies within and outside” (Foucault 2001: ref. no. 291: 978). 
On the other hand, the issue of the (legitimate) relation of the ruler to the ruled (emphasised 
both in ancient Greek politics and by sovereignty) stays a crucial issue of the state. This is an 
issue Foucault only very lightly touches upon, for example when he cites Rousseau and his 
discussions of a ‘social contract’ (Foucault 2001: ref. no. 239: 654). But as we know, the issue 
of legitimacy and of who should rule – when and how (!) – is still a hot issue of contestation 
today in what we call our liberal democratic state, and in the field of ‘democracy theory’. 
 
The articulation of the subject that is coextensive with the development of a modern 
governmental state, is then first of all a subject that is submitted to morality, that is to general 
normative rules about how to behave correctly to be a ‘good man’ (or occasionally and later a 
‘good woman’). These rules are in part derived from pastoral power, with the difference that 
norms and rules of good behaviour extend well beyond matters pertaining to personal 
guidance towards God. That “labor [becomes] the most esteemed of all human activities” 
(Arendt 1999: 101) and that it becomes a virtue to exercise one’s rights as a citizen, are thus 
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examples of how a pastoral conception of the individual is conjugated with (ancient) political 
and economic forms of power.  
 
The concern with each and every part of individual behaviour is what makes the issue of the 
‘conduct of our conduct’ so crucial to a governmental form of power. And this ‘conduct of 
conduct’ again takes on many concrete configurations, regarding within which modalities it is 
formed. A governmentality perspective thus does not suggest that there is only one way of 
‘conducting conducts’ but rather the phrase puts emphasis on how important individual 
behaviour and the category of the subject become in the ‘governmental state’. I will come 
back to this in the concluding parts of the article. 
 
The above analysis simplifies the issues at stake almost to a critical level. Indeed, a central 
part of the story is about how the multiple power forms within the state, as it was being 
discussed in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries were in opposition to each other, and also 
how they became conjugated with each other. Further, the history of governmentality did of 
course not stop here12. An immense and extensive development of and debate over state 
reason, governmental power, managerialism (managementality), liberalism, etc. has occurred 
and still occurs today.  
 
Still, as I see it, these further historic developments are elaborations of themes that already are 
present in the history analysed above. For example, the division of society into civil society, 
the economy and the state is a reformulation of an older division present in the treaties of the 
seventeenth century concerning advices to the ‘dauphin’ about the government of himself, the 
family and the state (cf. p.17, Foucault 2001: ref. no. 239: 640-641, see also ref. no. 274: 
820). Thus the emergence of governmentality as a specific rationality of power and rule has 
been the condition of possibility for the raise of our modern societies, for the raise of political 
science as a discipline and ultimately for the issue of steering to become relevant to us. In the 
following, I will try to sum up what the most important inherent features of the 
governmentality rationality are, especially focusing on the ‘steering dimension’. 
                                                 
12 Mitchell Dean’s work is an example of the further discussion and elaboration of (historic and theoretical) 
themes that I haven’t been able to include in my review of the history here (see Dean 1999, 2001, 2002a, 2002b). 
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4. Steering and governmentality 
The above discussion of governmentality has substantial, theoretical and normative 
implications and consequences, which obviously overlap. The substantial and theoretical part 
both concerns the leading questions of the article about the desirability and possibility of 
steering, and the questions of what a Foucauldian power perspective implies for the 
understanding of the problem of ’steering’ and government. The governmentality perspective 
thus offers qualifications of and rephrases some of the essential issues of the governance 
debate. Finally, the normative implications of the analysis concerns the critical stance of the 
governance and governmentality studies – and the apparent problems that arise, if we want to 
take a critical stance to e.g. B. Guy Peters’ argument – ‘that an effective government is a good 
thing’ (cf. page 1). 
 
Steering is today perceived as desirable, because a centralised governmental state has 
developed, which sees the welfare and security of the population as a political issue and as its 
inherent purpose. The welfare of the population is ‘policed’ through the analysis (sciences), 
nurturing (bio-politics) and ordering (schools, armies, factories, prisons, cities, etc.) of all 
individuals within a (sovereign) nation. On the other hand, steering is possible, because we 
have become a population of ‘free subjects’, capable of being both subjects and objects of this 
rationality of state. In gross, we have become subjects to the state through a long process of 
‘subjectivation’, as mentioned briefly above (cf. Foucault 1984). Morality has become a 
political issue, and the ethics of our individual conduct have become an issue of concern for 
us, as well as for the state.  
4.1. A definition of steering 
The historical development of how governing and steering have become possible and 
desirable has several consequences for the way it is possible to understand and analyse 
governing or steering today – if we follow Foucault’s perspective. First of all, ‘governing’ 
(that is ‘steering’) has become a relational operation that concerns the creation of “a field of 
possibilities” (Foucault 2001: ref. no. 306: 1056, emphasis mine). Indeed, governmentality is 
a ‘strategy’ in the Foucauldian sense. As I have already stated (cf. page 14) a strategy 
“cumulates advantages and multiplies the benefits” (Foucault 2001: ref. no. 277: 836). To 
govern following Foucault is thus not the operation of one centre in society or following one 
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type of modality or rationality13. To delimit what steering or governing is according to 
Foucault is not (essentially) a theoretical problem. Different forms of power, e.g. 
‘government’ may appear in various empirical configurations, with “multiple individual 
disparities, objectives, given instrumentations on ourselves and others, more or less sectored 
or general institutionalisations and more or less rational organisations” (Foucault 2001: ref. 
no. 306: 1059-1060). 
 
Secondly, these power relations and this ‘field of possibilities’ have a subject as its object, as 
already mentioned above. The behaviour and subjectivity of each has become an important 
vehicle for and object of most public policies. Through the creation of a responsible legal 
subject, a political citizen with the right to vote, a patient that can be treated, a pupil that can 
receive teaching, a worker that can be employed, a manager that has the ability to manage, 
etc. our identities and personal possibilities of being ethical subjects have become tightly 
connected to the policies of state and of public welfare. This ‘governmentalization’ of ethics 
is for example reflected by the tendency to conflate the meaning of the words ‘ethics’ and 
‘morality’ in common sense language. 
 
However, the third crucial element that is born out of the ‘governmentalization of the state’ is 
not that the state has come to govern more and more other parts of society (cf. page 13). 
Rather, it is the development of a certain rationality of ‘communalisation’ that has become a 
central condition of possibility for modern societies. It is a core issue for the possibility of 
having any ‘policy’ or ‘politics’ in an essential sense, since both require a ‘common 
legitimate societal room’ (i.e. a ‘community’ in a non-normative, nominal sense)14.  This 
‘communalisation’ has the consequence of making the creation of these ‘legitimate wholes of 
populations/individuals’ a central act of any government, be it at state level, at the level of the 
enterprise or even at the level of collective action in so-called civil society. It is important to 
stress this aspect, since the existence of a ‘legitimate whole’ in no sense is a ‘natural’ 
phenomenon, but indeed is an important consequence of the political history of our 
contemporary so-called civilised western states. 
 
                                                 
13 In contrast to e.g. Luhmann’s definition of steering where “steering designates a very specific use of 
distinctions, namely the attempt to reduce the difference” (Luhmann 1997: 43).  
14 Cf. David Easton’s classical definition of politics as ‘the process whereby values are authoritatively allocated 
for the whole society” (Easton 1971: 141)  
 Page 24
Obviously, an important contribution of Foucault’s analysis of governmentality is his stress 
on the historicity and contingency of our practical and theoretical understanding of politics 
and the state today. What Foucault argues for, is that the definition of what it means to govern 
is changed gradually throughout history, and thus that the subject, practice and discourse of 
government has changed. Therefore, it is not unproblematic for us today to compare our 
forms of state power to the ones that were in rule 500 years ago, since the constituting 
elements of each form of governing power are essentially different.  
 
According to this view, the main interest of a governor in the times of ‘the prince’ was the 
territory and the strategic power game, not because a prince did not care about his ‘subjects’ 
but because the ‘care for the population’ as practice and discourse had not arisen yet to the 
level of state governing. In the same vein, it does not make sense to criticise that according to 
a governmentality perspective, we cannot account for so-called ‘sovereign’ forms of power 
today (cf. Dean 2002b). Sovereign power never ceased to be an important part of what 
constitutes a state and governmental power, not least in international relations (where the 
‘mean-main’ topic and delimiting concept of almost all theories is ‘sovereignty’).  
 
According to Foucault’s governmentality story, government and governing is and has for a 
long time been an operation with a ‘plurality of specific goals’ as well as governing subjects. 
This is reflected in the number of different semantic concepts addressing the issues of 
government, as this article also is an illustration of. To ‘govern’ can be to lead, to conduct, to 
manage, to steer, to guide, etc. The different modalities of a governmental rationality are also 
identifiable at the level of the discipline of political science as a structure that is found in the 
institutions of the discipline: the departments, conferences, journals, curriculums, etc.15. We 
thus did not have to wait to the advent of political liberalism to receive a ‘decentred’ 
perspective on government (cf. Foucault 2001, ref. no. 274, see also Walther 1984), even 
though liberalism in itself is a valuable reflection upon and reformulation of what 
governmental power is and should be. 
 
Governmentality offers some ambivalent conditions of being for the state and society, but it 
does not delimit the exhaustive possibilities of them. It argues for the importance of 
                                                 
15 As an example, the curriculum of a bachelor study of Political Science at the University of Copenhagen 
consists of the following topics: Sociology, Methodology, Economy, International Politics, Comparative Politics, 
Public Administration and Public Law, see http://sis.ku.dk/, page downloaded November 18. 2002. 
 Page 25
understanding how ‘the conduct of conduct’ becomes a central logic of government, without 
necessarily reducing all governmental acts to that. Therefore, Foucault’s analysis is a standing 
invitation for all eager to know ourselves and our society better to go about doing empirical 
analysis, that can broaden the sketches he began elaborating when he started analysing the 
issue and problem of ‘government’ (cf. Foucault 2001: ref. no. 239: 655). And the focus of 
possible empirical analysis is very broad; encompassing what Dean calls the ‘episteme’ 
(rationality, regime, theory, philosophy, ideology), the ‘techne’ (practices, technologies, 
effects) and the ‘ethos’ (individual and collective identity, forms of subjectivity and agency) 
of government (Dean 2002b: 119-120). 
4.2. Governance revisited 
Foucault’s analysis of governmentality offers some possibilities of clarifying issues and 
theoretical problems pertaining to the governance debate. First of all, it becomes clear that the 
governance debate itself is a part of the empirical material available for governmentality 
researchers of today. In that sense, the authors I discussed in the first part of my article are 
‘caught’ in a web of interfering concepts and understandings relative to our understanding of 
government today, just as the writers of the ‘art of government’ treaties or the promoters of 
the ‘reason of state’ doctrine were in the sixteenth and seventeenth century. 
 
On a more substantial level, a theoretical problem of a large part of governance theorists is 
that they confuse the problem of steering with the problem of the dominance of the state as 
steering subject – which in turn is sanctioned as a good or a bad thing – either as something to 
(re-) enforce in an old or new way (cf. Mayntz 1993, Jessop 1998, Dunsire 1993) – or as 
something to get rid of – in practice (as a perversion, cf. Luhmann 1997) or in theory (as a 
perspective, cf. Kooiman 1999, Rhodes 2000).  
 
Yet, seen from a governmentality perspective, society is not necessarily to be seen as 
dominated by a state – since the state as such is not a unitary steering subject. Instead the 
argument is that a certain rationality of steering has emerged historically and has become a 
central function in society overall, and that multiple subjects (including ourselves) perform 
the operation ‘steering’ today. This is why Foucault advocates for a change in perspective, 
from a focus on the ‘étatisation of society’ to one on ‘the governmentalization of the state’ – 
that is to analyse how this rationality of steering has come to permeate our society and state 
today. 
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 It is misleading to say that steering is not possible without a state, or that steering necessarily 
is challenged in a condition where the state is becoming less central to understanding political 
processes and the development of policies. This is the point that the ‘second part’ of the 
governance theorists acknowledge, as I have shown above (cf. part 2.3.). The difference 
between governance theorists and Foucault is however, that the latter focused on how steering 
already several centuries ago was an operation that ‘covered all kind of governance 
mechanisms’ and that government never ‘performed all the governing itself’ – to borrow a 
few lines from the argument of KKK (Kickert, Klijn & Koppenjan 1997: 2). 
 
Following this, it is also misleading to contrast hierarchical steering and the rule of law with 
heterarchical steering and reflexive government technologies – if one uses the distinction to 
establish that steering today is less predictable or controllable than in the past. As already 
stated, both forms of steering were and are vulnerable to diverse strategies of evasion, as for 
example Pierre Bourdieu’s discussion of ‘Droit & Passe-droit’ – the rule of law 
encompassing the practice of making exceptions to it – shows (Bourdieu 1990).  
 
The fragility of and challenge to steering relations are not new phenomena that have 
developed during the last 30 years, as most governance theorists want us to believe. The ‘rule 
of law’ or of hierarchies were as unstable then as now. The reason for this is that hierarchies 
and rules already then were instruments or technologies of rule, that is modalities of power, 
and not ‘the divine justification’ of the state, as they accordingly were in medieval times. All 
modalities of government being a part of a strategic field of possibilities, that has ‘a legitimate 
whole’ of ‘free subjects’ as its object means that all modalities of power are continuously 
contested and rarely obtain a dominant position – where the performance of one modality 
becomes ‘automatic’, even though this can of course be an empirical possibility in certain 
institutional environments and periods. 
  
If the state is challenged by Foucault’s governmentality analysis, it however remains a crucial 
concept to the understanding of steering and governance. It is clear in Foucault’s analysis (cf. 
Foucault 2001: ref. no. 306: 1060) (and obvious in any introductory political science course) 
that the state was and still is strongly associated to an idea of a certain rationality of 
government and steering. The debate in the past as well as now concerns how, why, how not 
and why not the state can be the central governing and steering subject. That the state does not 
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(and probably never did) perform all steering functions or never came to play the intended 
role does not mean that the idea of having a state capable of steering is of no use at all and 
should be rejected. We are indebted to the state as a central category in understanding power 
and knowledge, and that we critique this state so vividly can even be seen as a proof of how 
vital the category is to us (cf. Bartelson 2001).  
5. Concluding remarks 
These concluding remarks concern the normative implications of the governmentality 
perspective, the possibilities of providing a critique, and subsequently a research agenda for 
the analysis of steering public administrations. Indeed, the danger with the concept of 
governmentality is that the phenomenon potentially has become so dominant in society and in 
the management of the state, as to making the very idea of thinking beyond or beside it absurd 
and totally adverse to all practice and discourse in public administrations and society as a 
whole, as I have already intended to show with my quoting of Peters (cf. page 1; Peters 2000: 
40). In other words: How is it possible to analyse public administrations as anything but 
governed by governmentality, and how is it possible (if at all desirable?) not to more or less 
explicitly have as a goal to make this governance better – more efficient or legitimate? 
 
As I see it, there are at least two ways out: One concerns the possibility of doing empirical 
analysis about e.g. public administrations not (necessarily) concerned with making these work 
better. The other concerns the possibility of raising a research agenda that directly question 
the normative implications of a traditional steering perspective. The first way out has its point 
of departure within the discipline of Public Administration itself. The second way out is 
placed on the margins between disciplines, and takes its point of departure primarily within 
political theory.  
 
One way of analysing steering could accordingly be to abandon the implicit normative 
position of much Public Administration research, that focuses on implicitly or explicitly to 
make these work better. According to Peter Bogason, this research task is already taken up 
within parts of the American post-modern PA discipline (see Bogason 2001a). It could be 
argued that the research agendas proposed by Rhodes and Kooiman offer two ways of 
analysing the ‘conduct of public administrations’ from a similar perspective: A narrative 
approach does not privilege one level of analysis over others, and potentially lead to a richer 
analysis of the implications, conditions and consequences of the attempts to steer society (cf. 
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Rhodes 2000). ‘Societal governance’ (cf. Kooiman 2000), and an explicit focus on diversity, 
dynamics and complexity also potentially opens up for an analysis of the contingency of 
steering operations. 
  
Another way of analysing public administrations and their interactions with society is 
reflected by the (mainly) theoretical attempts within political theory, that are preoccupied with 
the need to reformulate a concern and theory of the social dealing with community (cf. Bang 
& Dyrberg 1999, Bang & Sørensen 1998). This position thus advocates analyses of 
contemporary societal development, where the concept of ‘community’ and the ‘social 
activities of individuals’ neither are made a prerequisite of a democratic state (the role 
assigned to civil society in much democracy theory), nor is made a function of public 
administrations (communities as forums ensuring the efficiency of public policies, cf. 
Newman et.al. 2002).  
 
The way we organise ourselves need not necessarily concern ‘the common good’ and need 
not be (made) relevant for the functioning of the state or society as a whole. In short, the 
purpose of this strand of research is to question the normative implications of the 
‘communality’ of public policies and to find answers beyond the traditional divide between 
communitarian and liberal understandings of society – since both are articulations within the 
governmentality history (cf. Foucault 2001: ref. no. 291: 980). What is at stake is to develop 
theories that offers us a possibility to analyse ‘public administrations’ as societal actors in 
their own right (and not as ‘instruments’ of a certain rationality or of a state), as for example 
self-determined ‘street-level bureaucrats’ that live and act on the margins between a 
‘governmentalised society and state’ and a social world of every day practices that are 
permeated by various other strategies and rationalities (cf. Certeau 1990). 
 
Foucault’s governmentality perspective represents in itself a vital research programme for 
analysing societal issues, as for example the ‘conduct of public administrations’. But first of 
all, the perspective offers a focus on the conditions of possibility of the discipline of Public 
Administration as such. Therefore, one important implication of following a governmentality 
perspective must be for us to become aware of this legacy. We need to take a stand to our own 
position within this “living museum” of political science (Bartelson 2001: 30) – that steering, 
governance and management are ‘a good thing’ – instead of making it our blind spot.  
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